Environmental Protection Information Center v. the Simpson Timber Company: Who Is the Ninth Circuit Really Protecting with Section 10 of the Endangered Species Act by Cortese, Dina
Volume 13 Issue 2 Article 3 
2002 
Environmental Protection Information Center v. the Simpson 
Timber Company: Who Is the Ninth Circuit Really Protecting with 
Section 10 of the Endangered Species Act 
Dina Cortese 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj 
 Part of the Environmental Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Dina Cortese, Environmental Protection Information Center v. the Simpson Timber Company: Who Is the 
Ninth Circuit Really Protecting with Section 10 of the Endangered Species Act, 13 Vill. Envtl. L.J. 263 
(2002). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol13/iss2/3 
This Casenote is brought to you for free and open access by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Villanova Environmental Law Journal by an authorized 
editor of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. 
2002]
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION INFORMATION CENTER v. THE
SIMPSON TIMBER COMPANY WHO IS THE NINTH CIRCUIT
REALLY PROTECTING WITH SECTION 10 OF THE
ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT?
I. INTRODUCTION
Environmental Protection Information Center v. The Simpson Timber
Company (EPIC I1)1 is one of the most recent obstacles in Congress'
pursuit to protect endangered and threatened species under the
Endangered Species Act (ESA).2 Congress and the United States
Supreme Court have worked jointly to ensure full compliance with
ESA. 3 The decision of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit,
in EPIC II, however, purports to protect commercial activity at the
expense of endangered and threatened species. 4 EPIC II is thus an
example of a conflict arising between the Ninth Circuit's ESA inter-
pretation and Congress' intent in enacting the statute.5
This Note discusses the Ninth Circuit's protection of economic
interests at the expense of endangered and threatened species.
Section II of this Note summarizes the facts of EPIC I1.6 Section III
discusses important Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit cases regard-
ing ESA, as well as federal agencies' duties under the statute. 7 Sec-
1. 255 F.3d 1073 (9th Cir. 2001) [hereinafter EPIC I] (discussing various obli-
gations and duties of federal agencies under Endangered Species Act).
2. Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1540 (2000) [hereinafter ESA].
The Supreme Court heralded ESA as "the most comprehensive legislation for the
preservation of endangered species ever enacted by any nation." Tenn. Valley
Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 180 (1978) [hereinafter TVA].
3. See TVA, 437 U.S. at 184 (observing Congress' intent to halt and reverse
trend toward species extinction at any cost is literally in every section of ESA). For
a discussion on the facts and holding of TVA, see infra notes 52-58 and accompany-
ing text.
4. See EPIC I, 255 F.3d at 1081 n.6. The EPIC Il court denied an injunction to
halt a logging company's activities on 380,000 acres of timberland despite the list-
ing of two threatened species inhabiting the land. See id. at 1075.
5. See id. at 1076 (interpreting ESA, Consultation Procedures, Reinitiation of
Consultation, 50 C.F.R. § 402.16 (2000) to require sufficient discretionary federal
involvement to trigger duty to reinitiate consultation); see also Sierra Club v. Bab-
bitt, 65 F.3d 1502, 1509 (9th Cir. 1995) [hereinafter Sierra Club] (holding duty to
reinitiate consultation was not triggered because insufficient discretion retained).
For a discussion on Sierra Club, see infra notes 59-64 and accompanying text.
6. For a summary of EPIC Ifs facts, see infra notes 10-30 and accompanying
text.
7. For a discussion of important Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit ESA deci-
sions as well as federal agencies' duties under ESA, see infra notes 31-74 and accom-
panying text.
(263)
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tion IV of this Note follows with an examination of the Ninth
Circuit's opinion, including a critique of the EPIC II court's analysis
in Section V.8 Finally, Section VI hypothesizes the impact of this
case.
9
II. FACTS
EPIC II arose out of a dispute concerning the logging activities
that The Simpson Timber Company (Simpson) conducted in
northern California. 10 Simpson carries out logging activities on
380,000 acres of timberland, an area inhabited by the northern
spotted owl." In 1990, the Secretary of the Interior (Secretary)
listed the northern spotted owl as a threatened species pursuant to
Section 4 of ESA. 12 The Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) issued
Simpson an incidental take permit for the northern spotted owl on
September 17, 1992.13 In issuing the incidental take permit, FWS
8. For an analysis and critique of the EPIC II court's opinion, see infra notes
75-141 and accompanying text.
9. For a discussion of the impact and likely effects of EPIC II, see infra notes
142-53 and accompanying text.
10. See Envtl. Prot. Info. Ctr. v. Simpson Timber Co., No. C 98-3740 CRB, 1999
WL 183606, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 30, 1999) [hereinafter EPIC 1]. The subsidiaries
of The Simpson Timber Company [hereinafter Simpson] were also defendants in
the action. See id.
11. See EPIC II, 255 F.3d at 1075. The Environmental Protection Information
Center [hereinafter EPIC] sought an injunction to stop Simpson's logging activi-
ties until the Fish and Wildlife Service [hereinafter FWS] reinitiated internal con-
sultation regarding the effects the logging activities would have on species other
than the northern spotted owl that were threatened or endangered. See id. The
District Court for the Northern District of California denied EPIC an injunction
because FWS did not retain enough discretion to trigger its duty to reinitiate inter-
nal consultation. SeeEPICI, 1999 WL 183606, at *5; see also Eric Fisher, Comment,
Habitat Conservation Planning Under the Endangered Species Act: No Surpises & The
Quest For Certainty, 67 U. COLO. L. REv. 371, 372 n.7 (1996). Fisher explains the
northern spotted owl nests almost exclusively in the old-growth forests in the Pa-
cific Northwest. See id. The logging industry values this area for the quantity and
quality of its lumber, however, logging there places the industry at a potential risk
of violating ESA. See id. (citations omitted).
12. See EPIC II, 255 F.3d at 1076. Section 4 of ESA grants the Secretary of the
Interior the authority to list species as threatened or endangered based solely on
the best scientific and commercial data available. See 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b) (1) (A)
(2000).
13. SeeEPIC II, 255 F.3d at 1077. The permit was issued to Simpson after FWS
completed an internal consultation process as required by Section 7(a)(2) of ESA.
See id. The issuing agency must consult with FWS if the issuance of an incidental
take permit may affect other species listed as threatened or endangered. See id. at
1075. Since FWS acted as both the issuing agency and the agency with which it
must consult, it was necessary for FWS to conduct an internal consultation process
following the subsequent listing of the marbled murrelet and the coho salmon as
threatened species. See id. For a further discussion on the consultation process, see
infra note 36. For a discussion on the terms of Simpson's incidental take permit,
see infra notes 22-23 and accompanying text.
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acted pursuant to Section 10 of ESA, authorizing FWS to grant per-
mits to applicants who may "take" an endangered or threatened
species incidental to an otherwise lawful act.14 ESA defines "take"
to include harassing, hunting, shooting or wounding an endan-
gered or threatened species. 15
The Environmental Protection Information Center (EPIC) is a
non-profit organization involved in combating environmental deg-
radation of California's North Coast. 16 In 1999, EPIC named FWS
as a defendant in their claim against Simpson.1 7 EPIC contended
that FWS violated Section 7 of ESA by not adequately investigating
the possible effects that Simpson's incidental take permit may have
on two species subsequently listed as threatened or endangered.18
The two species at issue, the marbled murrelet and the coho
salmon, inhabit Simpson's timberland along with the northern
spotted owl 19 EPIC relied heavily on ESA Section 7(a) (2), requir-
ing all federal agencies to "insure that any action authorized,
funded, or carried out by such agency... is not likely to jeopardize
the continued existence of any endangered species or threatened
species or result in the destruction or adverse modification of
habitat of such species." 20 EPIC alleged that FWS had a duty, trig-
14. See 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a) (1) (B) (2000). Under Section 10 of ESA, "the Sec-
retary [of the Interior] may permit... any taking [which] is incidental to, and not
the purpose of, the carrying out of an otherwise lawful activity." Id.
15. See 16 U.S.C. § 1532(19) (2000). Section 3 of ESA broadly defines "take"
to mean "harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect,
or to attempt to engage in any such conduct." Id.
16. See EPIC I, 1999 WL 183606, at *1.
17. See id. EPIC argued that FWS's failure to complete an internal consulta-
tion regarding the effects that Simpson's incidental take permit would have on the
marbled murrelet and the coho salmon was grounds for an injunction of Simp-
son's logging activities. See id.
18. See EPIC II, 255 F.3d at 1074-75. Section 7 of ESA requires federal agen-
cies to ensure that any action they authorize, fund or carry out will not likely jeop-
ardize an endangered or threatened species. See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a) (2) (2000).
19. See EPIC II, 255 F.3d at 1076. FWS added the marbled murrelet, a bird, to
the threatened species list months after it issued Simpson its permit. See id. One
resource states "[t] his species is still abundant, but qualifies as vulnerable owing to
a rapid population reduction, equivalent to 31-48% in ten years, owing to a variety
of threats. This decline will continue until the principal breeding habitat, the old-
growth forest, is adequately protected." See United Nations Environment Pro-
gramme, World Conservation Monitoring Centre, UNEP-WCMC Database, at http:/
/www.unep-wcmc.org/species/animals/animal-redlist.html (last visited January
21, 2002). National Marine Fisheries Service [hereinafter NMFS] listed the coho
salmon as threatened nearly five years after the marbled murrelet was listed as
threatened. See EPIC II, 255 F.3d at 1076. For a discussion on the distinction be-
tween FWS and NMFS, see infra note 33.
20. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a) (2) (2000). "Action" is defined as "all activities or pro-
grams of any kind authorized, funded, or carried out, in whole or in part, by Fed-
eral agencies . . . ." Joint Regulations, Endangered Species Act, Definitions, 50
EPIC H2002]
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gered when the two species were listed as threatened, to reinitiate
internal consultation in order to evaluate possible effects that Simp-
son's logging activities may have on the marbled murrelet and coho
salmon. 21
Simpson applied for its incidental take permit in 1990 because
the company was exposed to potential liability under Section 9 of
ESA for "taking" northern spotted owls when FWS listed them as a
threatened species.22 ESA required Simpson to submit a Habitat
Conservation Plan (HCP) and an Implementation Agreement (IA)
as part of its permit application. 23 These two documents were in-
corporated into the incidental take permit when FWS approved
Simpson's application. 24 Simpson's HCP included reporting re-
quirements, mitigation measures and monitoring by FWS and state
C.F.R. § 402.02 (2000). The issuance of an incidental take permit qualifies as
agency action under Section 7(a) (2) according to the parties involved in the litiga-
tion. See EPIC II, 255 F.3d at 1075. If an agency determines that an action "may
affect" an endangered or threatened species, 50 C.F.R. § 402.14 mandates that the
agency must consult with either FWS or NMFS. See id. Title 50 C.F.R. § 402.16
further states that reinitiation of formal consultation is required where federal in-
volvement or control over an action is retained or authorized by law. See Joint
Regulations, Endangered Species Act, Consultation Procedures, Reinitiation of
Consultation, 50 C.F.R. § 402.16 (2000). The Joint Regulations state:
Reinitiation of formal consultation is required and shall be requested by
the Federal agency or by the Service, where discretionary Federal involvement
or control over the action has been retained or is authorized by law and:
(a) If the amount or extent of taking specified in the incidental take
statement is exceeded;
(b) If new information reveals effects of the action that may affect listed
species or critical habitat in a manner or to an extent not previously
considered;
(c) If the identified action is subsequently modified in a manner that
causes an effect to the listed species or critical habitat that was not
considered in the biological opinion; or
(d) If a new species is listed or critical habitat designated that may be affected
by the identified action.
Id. (emphasis added).
21. See EPIC II, 255 F.3d at 1076. FWS, according to EPIC, retained sufficient
discretionary involvement or control over Simpson's spotted owl permit to trigger
its duty to reinitiate consultation. See id.
22. See id. The permit was to last for thirty years and allowed Simpson to
"take" up to fifty pairs of northern spotted owls during the first ten years. See EPIC
, 1999 WL 183606, at *2.
23. See EPIC II, 255 F.3d at 1076-77. The Habitat Conservation Plan [hereinaf-
ter HCP], which FWS requires in order to issue an incidental take permit, explains
"(i) the impact which will likely result from [the] taking; (ii) what steps the appli-
cant will take to minimize and mitigate such impacts; and . . . (iv) such other
measures that the Secretary may require as being necessary or appropriate for pur-
poses of the plan." Id. at 1077 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(2) (A) (1994)). The
Implementation Agreement [hereinafter IA] outlines the permit holder's plan to
carry out its obligation in the HCP. See id.
24. See id. Simpson submitted the HCP on April 15, 1992 and the IA on Sep-
tember 17, 1992. See id. at 1076-77 nn.3, 4.
4
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agencies.2 5 Further, Simpson provided research showing its in-
tended measures would not have a significant adverse impact on
the northern spotted owl and "its conservation program would con-
tribute to the survival and recovery of that species." 26 FWS retained
some ongoing involvement and authority over Simpson's permit.2 7
The District Court for the Northern District of California re-
jected EPIC's claims that provisions in the permit were sufficient to
trigger FWS's duty to reinitiate internal consultation.28 Accord-
ingly, the district court dismissed the case with prejudice for failure
to state a claim. 29 The Ninth Circuit affirmed the lower court's
decision. 30
III. BACKGROUND
Congress enacted ESA in 1973 and the statute remains "our
primary federal law for the protection of biological diversity." 31
Congress intended "to provide a means whereby the ecosystems
upon which endangered species and threatened species depend
may be conserved, [and] to provide a program for the conservation
25. See id. at 1077. Simpson's mitigation measures stated that it would "mod-
ify silvicultural systems as appropriate to ensure compatibility with the habitat re-
quirements of other species found within Simpson's ownership that are considered
sensitive by state and federal regulatory agencies." Id. at 1077. For a discussion of
the EPIC 11 court's interpretation of this language, see infra notes 89-91 and accom-
panying text.
26. See EPIC II, 255 F.3d at 1077; see also Fisher, supra note 11, at 373 (com-
menting "[1]egislators believed that the adverse impacts of an incidental take
could be offset by the benefits of developing a plan designed to set aside habitat
necessary to ensure the long-term viability of an endangered species.").
27. See EPIC II, 255 F.3d at 1078. For example, FWS is entitled to review the
permit ten years after its issuance and to evaluate whether Simpson has complied
with its terms before allowing its logging operation to continue. See id. FWS may
suspend the permit for "any significant violation or breach" at any time or may
revoke it if a threatened species which is not the subject of the permit is taken. See
id.
28. See id. The district court categorized the provisions as evidence that FWS
only had "'involvement in the continuing administration of the permit.'" Id.
29. See EPIC I, No. C 98-3740 CRB, 1999 WL 183606, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 30,
1999). The district court stated, "[t]he motion to dismiss for failure to state a
claim is viewed with disfavor and is rarely granted." Id. at *3 (citing Gilligan v.
Jamco Dev. Corp., 108 F.3d 246, 249 (9th Cir. 1997)). The district court further
stated, "[a] complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it
appears beyond a doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his
claim which would entitle him to relief." Id. (citing Parks Sch. of Bus., Inc. v.
Symington, 51 F.3d 1480, 1484 (9th Cir. 1995)).
30. See EPIC II, 255 F.3d at 1075.
31. Federico Cheever, The Endangered Species Act Issues: An Introduction, SF 34
ALI-ABA 289, 291 (Oct. 2000) (noting ESA is most important law with respect to
endangered species).
20021 EPIC II 267
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of such endangered species and threatened species."3 2 Section 4 of
ESA empowers the Secretary to determine whether a species is en-
dangered or threatened based solely on the best scientific or com-
mercial data available.33 The Secretary's analysis focuses on several
factors, including "the present or threatened destruction, modifica-
tion, or curtailment of [a species'] habitat."3 4
A. Federal Agencies' Duties Under ESA
Section 7 of ESA requires federal agencies, such as FWS and
National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS), to ensure that any ac-
tion they authorize, fund or carry out "is not likely to jeopardize the
continued existence of any endangered species or threatened spe-
cies or result in the destruction or adverse modification of habitat
of such species. '35 ESA Section 7 also mandates federal agencies to
consult with the Secretary to ensure that destruction or adverse
modification does not result from federal action.3 6 In addition,
32. ESA, 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b) (2000). Congress desired to halt the rate at
which various species of plants, fish and wildlife were being brought to the point of
extinction as a result of uncurbed economic growth and development. See 16
U.S.C. § 1531(a)(1) (2000).
33. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 1533(a), (b)(1)(A) (2000). Both the Departments of In-
terior and Commerce have a role in implementing ESA. SeeJohn W. Steiger, The
Consultation Provision of Section 7(A)(2) of the Endangered Species Act and Its Application
to Delegable Federal Programs, 21 EcOLOGY L.Q. 243, 246 (1994). The Secretary of the
Interior acts through FWS and is responsible for terrestrial and freshwater species.
See id. The Secretary of Commerce acts through NMFS and oversees marine spe-
cies. See id. In this Note, the term "Secretary" refers to the Secretary of the Inte-
rior unless otherwise specified. Congress defined "endangered species" as "any
species which is in danger of extinction throughout all or a significant portion of
its range." 16 U.S.C. § 1532(6) (2000). A "threatened species" is defined as "any
species which is likely to become an endangered species within the foreseeable
future throughout all or a significant portion of its range." 16 U.S.C. § 1532(20)
(2000).
34. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(1)(A) (2000). The Secretary may not consider the
economic impact when listing a species as endangered or threatened. See New
Mexico Cattle Growers Ass'n v. Norton, 248 F.3d 1277, 1282 (10th Cir. 2001) (stat-
ing ESA specifically requires listing determinations be based on best scientific and
commercial data available).
35. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (2000) (requiring federal agencies consult with
FWS to ensure compatibility between federal project and ESA).
36. See Steiger, supra note 33, at 274 (citing Oliver A. Houck, The "Institutional-
ization of Caution" Under § 7 of the Endangered Species Act: What Do You Do When You
Don't Know?, 12 ENvrL. L. REP. 15,001 (1982)) (stating duty to consult has been
called "heart" of ESA § 7). Consultation must be initiated when a federal action,
such as issuing an incidental take permit, may affect a listed species. SeeJoint Reg-
ulations, Endangered Species Act, Consultation Procedures, Formal Consultation,
50 C.F.R. § 402.14(a) (2000). The consultation process ends with a biological
opinion, issued by FWS or NMFS, stating whether the agency action is likely to
jeopardize the listed species or adversely affect its critical habitat. See Steiger, supra
note 33, at 252. Parties may not make "any irreversible or irretrievable commit-
6
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Section 9 makes it unlawful to "take" an endangered species.3 7 The
Secretary may issue incidental take permits under Section 10 of
ESA "if [the] taking is incidental to, and not the purpose of, the
carrying out of an otherwise lawful activity."38 ESA also allows any
person to commence citizen-suits to enjoin any other person, in-
cluding the federal government, for violations of the statute. 39
B. Supreme Court Decisions on ESA
The United States Supreme Court has decided several impor-
tant cases interpreting the obligations and elements of ESA.40 In
Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon,41 the
Supreme Court held that the Secretary of the Interior had not ex-
ceeded the scope of his authority when interpreting "harm" as it
appears in the definition of "take" to include "significant habitat
modification or degradation where it actually kills or injures wild-
life." 42 In Sweet Home, various parties who were dependent on the
forest industries of Oregon filed suit to challenge the Secretary's
ment of resources with respect to the agency action which has the effect of fore-
closing the formulation or implementation of any reasonable and prudent
alternative measures which would not violate" Section 7(a)(2). 16 U.S.C.
§ 1536(d) (2000). "The consultation requirement ensures that the action agency
will seriously consider the impact of its proposed action on listed' species and take
the necessary steps to prevent their jeopardy." Steiger, supra note 33, at 250.
37. See 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a) (1) (B) (2000). For a definition of the term "take"
under ESA, see supra note 15.
38. See 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(1)(B) (2000). Section 10 of ESA was enacted in
the 1982 amendments. See Habitat Conservation Planning Handbook, available at
http://endangered.fws.gov/hcp/hcpbook.htm (last updated July 25, 2001), at 1-1
[hereinafter Handbook]. Prior to 1982, if a listed species was taken while a non-
federal party was conducting an otherwise lawful activity, the individual would be
violating Section 9 without exemption. See id. ESA only authorized takings during
scientific research and other conservation action prior to 1982. See id.
39. See 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g) (1) (A) (2000). The citizen-suit provision states
"(1) ... any person may commence a civil suit on his own behalf... to enjoin any
person, including the United States and any other governmental instrumentality
or agency ... who is alleged to be in violation of any provision of this chapter or
regulation issued under the authority thereof. ... " Id.
40. For a detailed discussion on three Supreme Court cases relevant to the
Ninth Circuit's decision in EPIC II, see infra notes 41-58 and accompanying text.
41. 515 U.S. 687 (1995).
42. Id. at 708. The District Court for the District of Columbia held that the
Secretary's interpretation was reasonable based on its finding "that Congress in-
tended an expansive interpretation of the word 'take,' an interpretation that en-
compasses habitat modification." Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a
Great Or. v. Babbitt, 806 F. Supp. 279, 285 (D.D.C. 1992). The Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia initially affirmed the district court's holding. See Sweet
Home Chapters of Communities for a Great Or. v. Babbitt, 1 F.3d 1, 2 (D.C. Cir.
1993). The panel reversed that holding, however, after granting a petition for
rehearing. See Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Or. v. Babbitt, 17
F.3d 1463, 1472 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
EPIC H2002] 269
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regulation, claiming they had suffered economic harm when the
definition was applied to two species of birds.43 The Supreme
Court concluded that the Secretary's interpretation was reasonably
based upon three elements: (1) the ordinary meaning of the word
"harm"; (2) the broad purpose of ESA to protect against harm that
Congress had attempted to remedy by enacting ESA; and (3) Con-
gress' authorization of the issuance of permits for incidental tak-
ings.44 As a result of the holding in Sweet Home, the term "harm"
was extended to indirect as well as deliberate takings. 45
In Bennett v. Spear,46 the Supreme Court recognized a private
party's right to file citizen-suits for violations of ESA.47 Two irriga-
tion districts brought suit against FWS and the Secretary challeng-
ing a decision to maintain minimum water levels in two reservoirs
to avoid adversely modifying the critical habitat of two endangered
fish species.48 The irrigation districts claimed that the decision was
43. See Sweet Home, 515 U.S. at 692. The two species of birds included in the
Secretary's regulation were the red-cockaked woodpecker, listed as endangered,
and the northern spotted owl, listed as threatened. See id.
44. See id. at 697-700. The Supreme Court defined "harm" as "to cause hurt
or damage; injure." Id. at 697 (citing WEBSTER'S THIRD INTERNATIONAL DIcrIoNARY
1034 (1966)). In determining the broad purpose of ESA, the Supreme Court re-
lied on its previous language that described ESA as "the most comprehensive legis-
lation for the preservation of endangered species ever enacted by any nation." Id.
at 698 (citing TVA, 437 U.S. 153, 180 (1978)). For a discussion of TVA, see infra
notes 52-58 and accompanying text. Discussing Congress' authorization of the is-
suance of permits for incidental takings, one commentator stated that, in Sweet
Home, the Supreme Court "recognized that Congress, through § 10 of the ESA
Amendments of 1982, attempted to address the need to provide landowners with a
way to mitigate the potentially harsh effects of the ESA on the use and value of
their property." Fisher, supra note 11, at 380.
45. See Sweet Home, 515 U.S. at 697-98. The respondents, in Sweet Home, ar-
gued that, unless the Supreme Court recognized an extension of the term "take"
to include indirect and deliberate takings, statutory terms would duplicate other
terms. See id.
46. 520 U.S. 154 (1997).
47. See id. at 155 (recognizing ESA provision as possible avenue to remedy
violations of Act). Section 11 of ESA provides "[a]ny person who knowingly vio-
lates . . . any provision of this Act, or any provision of any permit or certificate
issued hereunder... may be assessed a civil penalty by the Secretary." 16 U.S.C.
§ 1540(a)(1) (2000).
48. See Bennett, 520 U.S. at 159. The two types of fish whose critical habitats
were in danger of being adversely affected were the Lost River Sucker and the
Shortnose Sucker. See id. The Secretary of the Interior [hereinafter Secretary]
entered the litigation when it took over a reclamation project entitled the Klamath
Project. See id. FWS consulted with the Bureau of Reclamation [hereinafter BR],
the administrator of the Klamath Project, regarding possible effects on the two
species of fish. See id. Ultimately, FWS determined that the Klamath Project could
affect the two species and that maintaining a minimum level of water on the Clear
Lake and Gerber Reservoirs was the best alternative to avoid any jeopardy to the
species. See id. at 158-59.
8
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not based on scientific or commercial data.49 The Supreme Court
reversed the Ninth Circuit's dismissal of the claim and held that the
irrigation districts had standing under the citizen-suit provision of
ESA because their claims satisfied the zones of interest test.50 Con-
sequently, the citizen-suit provision was expressly recognized as a
possible remedy for ESA violations. 51
The Court's holding in Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill (TVA) 52
is evidence that the Supreme Court is unwilling to undermine Con-
gress' ultimate goal in enacting ESA.53 The Supreme Court af-
firmed an injunction on the construction of the Tellico Dam, a
federally-funded project, in order to avoid destruction of the criti-
cal habitat of an endangered fish. 54 Congress had authorized the
dam's construction prior to enacting ESA.55 Tennessee Valley Au-
thority argued that because Congress had continued to fund the
project after 1973, Congress implicitly repealed ESA, at least as to
the Tellico Dam.5 6 The Supreme Court held that Congress had al-
49. See id. The irrigation districts asserted that BR was following the same
procedures for storing and releasing water from the two reservoirs throughout the
twentieth century; nonetheless, BR followed FWS's Biological Opinion. See id.
50. See id. at 179. The district court dismissed the claim for lack of jurisdic-
tion, reasoning that the petitioners' interests did not fall within the zone of inter-
est ESA seeks to protect. See id. at 160-61. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the decision,
holding that plaintiffs must allege an interest in the preservation of endangered
species to have standing under ESA. See id. (citing Bennett v. Plenert, 63 F.3d 915,
919 (9th Cir. 1995)).
51. See Preeti S. Chaudhari, Comment, Bennett v. Spear: Lions, Tigers and
Bears Beware; The Decline of Environmental Protection, 18 N. ILL. U.L. REv. 553,
564 (Summer 1998). Chaudhari stated that the Supreme Court based its recogni-
tion on two considerations: (1) that the environment is an area in which everyone
has an interest; and (2) that the citizen-suit provision was enacted to encourage
enforcement by citizens. See id.
52. 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
53. See id. at 153 (commenting that Section 7 of ESA applies to ongoing, fed-
erally-funded projects even if projects were approved before ESA's enactment).
One commentator noted that "[a]lthough Congress enacted [ ] ESA in 1973, the
scope of ESA Section 7 was not fully realized until the Supreme Court's sweeping
interpretation of the provision in TVA." Steiger, supra note 33, at 267 (footnotes
omitted).
54. See TVA, 437 U.S. at 195. The snail darter and its critical habitat were at
issue in TVA. See id. at 158. In the Court's analysis, the majority included the
Secretary's warning that "[t]he proposed impoundment of water behind the pro-
posed Tellico Dam would result in total destruction of the snail darter's habitat."
Id. at 162 (emphasis omitted) (citing 40 Fed. Reg. 47,506 n.12).
55. See id. at 157 (noting Congress appropriated funds for Tellico Dam in
1967).
56. See id. at 156. The Congressional appropriations committee reports of
1975, 1976 and 1977 "stated the committees' belief that Section 7 did not apply to
the dam, primarily because construction began before the snail darter was listed."
See Steiger, supra note 33, at 268 (footnotes omitted). The Supreme Court rejected
the Tennessee Valley Authority's attempt to support its argument with statements
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lotted endangered species the utmost protection under ESA, which
justified halting a federal project even though it was ninety percent
complete. 57 The TVA holding demonstrated that both Congress
and the Supreme Court acknowledged that the value of threatened
and endangered species cannot be calculated in dollar amounts. 5 8
C. The Ninth Circuit and ESA
The Ninth Circuit's ESA decisions focus on the circumstances
giving rise to a federal agency's duty to reinitiate consultation re-
garding endangered or threatened species.5 9 The Ninth Circuit, in
Sierra Club v. Babbitt,60 held that a federal agency was not required
to reinitiate consultation with FWS because FWS did not retain suf-
ficient discretion and involvement in a private agreement.61 In Si-
erra Club, the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) entered into a
from the House and Senate Appropriations Committees' Reports because the
Court refused to assume that the Committees were advising federal agencies to
ignore ESA. See TVA, 437 U.S. at 189. The TVA majority assumed that the "Com-
mittees believed that the Act simply was not applicable in this situation. But even
under this interpretation of the Committees' actions, [the Court was] unable to
conclude that the Act has been in any respect amended or repealed." Id.
57. See TVA, 437 U.S. at 184. Since Congress did not explicitly address
whether a nearly-completed project would be halted if an endangered species was
found in its path, the Supreme Court did not rely solely on the legislative history of
ESA to determine the appropriate course of action. See id. The Court, however,
resolved the issue based on the totality of congressional action. See id.
58. See id. at 187. The TVA majority refused to engage in a weighing process
between a certain sum of money and the "incalculable" value of endangered spe-
cies. The Court reasoned:
neither the [ESA] nor Art[icle] III of the Constitution provides federal
courts with authority to make such fine utilitarian calculations. On the
contrary, the plain language of the Act, buttressed by its legislative his-
tory, shows clearly that Congress viewed the value of endangered species
as 'incalculable.' Quite obviously, it would be difficult for a court to bal-
ance the loss of a sum certain - even $100 million - against a congres-
sionally declared 'incalculable' value, even assuming we had the power to
engage in such a weighing process, which we emphatically do not.
Id. at 187-88.
59. Compare Sierra Club v. Babbitt, 65 F.3d 1502, 1502-03 (9th Cir. 1995) (hold-
ing Bureau of Land Management's [hereinafter BLM] duty to reinitiate consulta-
tion with FWS was not triggered because sufficient discretion and involvement was
not retained over private right-of-way agreement), and EPIC II, 255 F.3d 1073, 1073
(9th Cir. 2001) (holding FWS was not required to reinitiate internal consultation
because sufficient discretion and involvement was not retained over private inci-
dental take permit), with Pac. Rivers Council v. Thomas, 30 F.3d 1050, 1050 (9th
Cir. 1994) [hereinafter PRC] (holding Forest Service had duty to initiate consulta-
tion with NMFS because Land Resource Management Plans [hereinafter LRMPs]
are ongoing agency action).
60. 65 F.3d 1502 (9th Cir. 1995).
61. Id. at 1502-03 (holding BLM did not retain sufficient discretion and in-
volvement over right-of-way agreement to trigger duty to reinitiate consultation
with FWS).
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private right-of-way agreement with a logging company in which
BLM retained the right to object to the logging company's activities
if the proposed route: (1) was not the most direct; (2) if it substan-
tially interfered with existing or planned facilities; or (3) if it re-
sulted in excessive soil erosion. 62 The Ninth Circuit concluded that
Section 7 of ESA did not confer authority on BLM to reinitiate con-
sultation with FWS since BLM had not originally retained sufficient
discretion over the right-of-way agreement, because none of the cir-
cumstances involved the protection of subsequently listed protected
animals.63 Consequently, Sierra Club demonstrated that the Ninth
Circuit focused on the amount and the nature of discretion a fed-
eral agency retains to determine whether the duty to reinitiate con-
sultation is triggered .64
In contrast, the Ninth Circuit, in Pacific Rivers Council v. Thomas
(PRC),65 required the Forest Service to reinitiate consultation with
NMFS. 66 The PRC court analyzed the effects of the Forest Service's
Land Resource Management Plans (LRMPs) on species of salmon
that had been added to the threatened list.67 The Ninth Circuit
determined that LRMPs constitute ongoing agency action based on
their duration and the far-reaching effects on national forests.68 By
requiring that the Forest Service reinitiate consultation with NMFS,
the Ninth Circuit clarified that determinations regarding the duty
to reinitiate consultation may be triggered if the action is deemed
62. See id. at 1505. A reciprocal right-of-way agreement is an exchange of
grants between the United States government and a private landowner. See id. at
1505 n.4. Parties to these agreements may use each other's existing roads and may
construct roads over each other's lands. See id.
63. See id. at 1509. Sierra Club provided the EPIC II court with the applicable
test: "Where . . . the federal agency lacks the discretion to influence the private
action, consultation would be a meaningless exercise; the agency simply does not
possess the ability to implement measures that inure to the benefit of the pro-
tected species." Id.
64. For a discussion on how the Ninth Circuit weighed factors such as the
nature and amount of discretion a federal agency retains in determining whether
the duty to reinitiate consultation is triggered in EPIC II, see infta notes 83-87 and
accompanying text.
65. 30 F.3d 1050 (9th Cir. 1994).
66. Id. The Ninth Circuit considered the far-reaching effects of LRMPs based
on their time duration and expansive impacts on forests after their adoption as
grounds for distinguishing LRMPs from incidental take permits. See EPIC II, 255
F.3d at 1080.
67. See PRC, 30 F.3d at 1051. The district court and the Ninth Circuit rejected
the argument that LRMPs were not agency actions requiring consultation under
Section 7(a)(2) because they were adopted before the salmon were listed as
threatened. See id.
68. See id. at 1053 (rejecting Forest Service's argument that LRMPs are only
ongoing agency action when adopted, revised, or amended in future).
2732002] EPIC H
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an ongoing agency action and the regulations have expansive
impacts.
6 9
Further, in Natural Resources Defense Council v. Houston,70 the
Ninth Circuit held that the Bureau of Reclamation (BR) violated
ESA by not assessing the environmental impact of water contract
renewals on endangered fish species. 71 The Houston court found
that the renewal of water contracts constituted agency action under
a broad definition. 72 The Ninth Circuit held that BR's renewal of
water contracts violated ESA Section 7 by not requesting formal
consultation with FWS.7 3 Overall, the Houston court's analysis fo-
cused on a federal agency's unique and affirmative duty to ensure
that its actions did not jeopardize endangered species.74
IV. NARRATIVE ANALYSIS
A. Determining Standing and the Appropriate Test
The Ninth Circuit applied de novo review to the district court's
dismissal of Plaintiffs' case for failure to state a claim.75 The EPIC II
court first determined that EPIC had standing to bring suit against
FWS under the citizen-suit provision of ESA.76 This finding was pri-
marily based on the Ninth Circuit's reading of the United States
69. See id. at 1053-54. The Ninth Circuit rejected the Forest Service's contrary
arguments that LRMPs did not constitute an ongoing agency action based on its
interpretation of the statute. See id. at 1053. The PRC court opined that Congress'
intent on the precise issue was ascertainable and must be given effect. Id. at 1054.
70. 146 F.3d 1118 (9th Cir. 1998).
71. See id. at 1133. The government entered into forty-year water service con-
tracts with non-federal defendants. See id. at 1123. Congress mandated that renew-
als of the water contracts be "under stated terms and conditions mutually
agreeable to the parties." See id. (citing 43 U.S.C. § 485h-1 (1) (2002)).
72. See id. at 1125 (citing TVA, 437 U.S. 153, 173 (1978) (stating "negotiating
and executing contracts is 'agency action.'").
73. See id. at 1127-28. The Ninth Circuit agreed with the district court's find-
ing that Section 7(d) was violated because the forty-year renewal contract consti-
tuted "an irreversible and irretrievable commitment of resources." Id. at 1128.
Further, the district court found BR was not permitted to proceed in executing the
contracts untii FWS found that a protected species would not be affected. See id.
74. See id. at 1127 (discussing BR's clear legal obligation to request formal
consultation with NMFS despite NMFS's opinion that consultation was
unnecessary).
75. See EPIC II, 255 F.3d 1073, 1078 (9th Cir. 2001). Section 706 of the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act [hereinafter APA] governs judicial review of adminis-
trative decisions involving ESA. See id. Section 706 allows a court to set aside an
agency action if that action is "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or oth-
erwise not in accordance with the law." 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2000).
76. See EPIC II, 255 F.3d at 1079. For the text of the citizen-suit provision, see
supra note 39.
[Vol. XIII: p. 263
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Supreme Court's decision in Bennett.77 The Ninth Circuit disagreed
with Simpson's reading of Bennett, which argued that the citizen-suit
provision of ESA does not apply to maladministration of ESA.78
The Ninth Circuit admitted that this element was part of Bennett's
final holding but distinguished the two cases in that EPIC sought to
enforce FWS's substantive obligation to ensure that FWS did not
authorize any activity that would likely jeopardize a threatened
species. 79
In its analysis to determine the applicable test, the Ninth Cir-
cuit focused on two pertinent cases, PRC and Sierra Club, ultimately
concluding that Sierra Club governed.80 Further, the EPIC II court
determined that FWS did not exercise enough federal control or
involvement to trigger its duty to reinitiate internal consultation af-
ter the marbled murrelet and coho salmon were listed as
threatened species because the permit only protected the northern
spotted owl.81
B. The Majority's Analysis of EPIC's Claim
Although the court disagreed with EPIC's contention that PRC
should govern, EPIC argued in the alternative that if Sierra Club pro-
vided the appropriate test, the test would be satisfied because FWS's
discretionary power could benefit the marbled murrelet and the
77. Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 173 (1997). The Supreme Court stated
that the citizen-suit provision "is a means by which private parties may enforce the
substantive provisions of the ESA against regulated parties - both private entities
and Government agencies." Id. at 173.
78. See EPIC II, 255 F.3d at 1079 (discussing Simpson's reliance upon and mis-
reading of Bennett in arguing that citizen-suit provision does not apply to EPIC's
suit because it falls within category of maladministration of ESA). For the statutory
language pertaining to citizen-suits under ESA, see supra note 76.
79. See id. The Ninth Circuit also stated that, even if it found EPIC did not
have citizen-suit standing under ESA, EPIC would still have standing to sue under
APA because EPIC sought to protect interests that clearly fall within the zone of
interests test required by APA. Id.
80. See EPIC II, 255 F.3d at 1079. The PRC court found that the Forest Service
had the duty to reinitiate consultation with NMFS because LRMPs constitute ongo-
ing agency action. See PRC, 30 F.3d 1050, 1050 (9th Cir. 1994). Conversely, the
Ninth Circuit, in Sierra Club, held that BLM did not retain sufficient discretionary
involvement and control over the right-of-way agreement with a private logging
company to trigger the duty to reinitiate consultation with FWS. See Sierra Club v.
Babbitt, 65 F.3d 1502, 1509 (9th Cir. 1995). For a discussion on the applicable test
from Sierra Club, see supra note 63.
81. SeeEPICII, 255 F.3d at 1079. EPIC's counter argument was based upon its
contention that FWS's duty to reinitiate consultation was triggered when the Ninth
Circuit's holding, in PRC, was combined with the plain language of 50 C.F.R.
§ 402.16 (2000) and the subsequent listing of the marbled murrelet and the coho
salmon. See id. For the language of 50 C.F.R. §402.16 (2000), see supra note 20.
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coho salmon. 82 The Ninth Circuit rejected the argument that po-
tential aid to an unlisted species would satisfy the Sierra Club test
because FWS, like BLM in Sierra Club, could not influence the pri-
vate party's activities based upon the insufficient level of federal in-
volvement or control it had retained. 83  The Ninth Circuit
analogized Simpson's incidental take permit with the right-of-way
agreement in Sierra Club, since agency authorization in both cases
pertained to a private action with the federal agency having only a
limited role. 84 The Ninth Circuit reasoned that it rejected PRC as
the controlling test due to the nature of the federal regulation and
the fact that LRMPs are comprehensive management plans that
govern agency action in forest planning decisions.85 "LRMPs have
an ongoing and long-lasting effect even after adoption . .. [and]
represent ongoing agency action. '86 The EPIC II court stated that
the Forest Service had plenary control in the area of LRMPs which
was not the case for FWS's control over Simpson's permit.8
7
One of EPIC's arguments regarding the test established in Si-
erra Club focused on the language of Simpson's HCP.8 8 EPIC drew
the Ninth Circuit's attention to language in a section in the HCP
concerning mitigation measures, stating "Simpson's [Timber Har-
vesting Plans] . . . will be designed to ... [m]odify silvicultural sys-
tems as appropriate to ensure compatibility with the habitat
82. See EPIC II, 255 F.3d at 1079. The EPIC II court noted that despite EPIC's
contention that FWS met the Sierra Club test, EPIC's first line of attack was to avoid
that test by arguing that PRC controlled the outcome. See id. at 1080.
83. See Sierra Club, 65 F.3d at 1505. Sierra Club involved a right-of-way agree-
ment between BLM and a private timber company. See id. There were only three
limited instances under which BLM could object to the timber company's activi-
ties. See id. at 1509 n.10. None of the instances involved the protection of a
threatened species. See id. The Sierra Club court considered the activities private
action and concluded "the agency simply does not possess the ability to implement
measures that inure to the benefit of the protected species." Id. at 1509.
84. See EPIC II, 255 F.3d at 1080. The district court outlined similarities that
EPIC drew between Simpson's incidental take permit and LRMPs. See EPIC I, No.
C 98-3740 CRB, 1999 WL 183606, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 30, 1999). For example,
EPIC focused on the time duration of the permit and LRMPs as a similarity and
emphasized that FWS has a right to revoke the permit if Simpson fails to comply
with its terms. See id. However, both the lower court and the Ninth Circuit re-
jected the purported analogies between Simpson's permit and the LRMPs. See id.
at *6; see also EPIC II, 255 F.3d at 1080.
85. See EPIC II, 255 F.3d at 1080 (distinguishing LRMPs from right-of-way
agreement in Sierra Club).
86. PRC, 30 F.3d 1050, 1053 (9th Cir. 1994). The Ninth Circuit discussed how
LRMPs are very comprehensive and govern a multitude of individual projects in
national forests. See id.
87. See EPIC II, 255 F.3d at 1080 (discussing differences between LRMPs and
incidental take permits).
88. See id. For an explanation on what an HCP entails, see supra note 23.
14
Villanova Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 13, Iss. 2 [2002], Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol13/iss2/3
requirements of other species found within Simpson's ownership
that are considered sensitive by state and federal regulatory agen-
cies."89 The Ninth Circuit disagreed with EPIC's contention that
Simpson's assurance extended to species that might be listed in the
future and interpreted the language to mean that "Simpson will
modify silvicultural systems to accommodate other currently listed
species, not species that might subsequently be listed. 9° The EPIC
II court observed that FWS did not retain discretionary control to
create new requirements in the permit documents for the protec-
tion of species that might subsequently be listed as endangered or
threatened.91
The Ninth Circuit next addressed and rejected EPIC's argu-
ment that other provisions in the HCP and IA authorized FWS to
protect other species in addition to the northern spotted owl. 92
The EPIC II court found that none of the provisions of the HCP or
IA afforded FWS the authority to reinitiate internal consultation be-
cause FWS's scope of control did not extend to species other than
the northern spotted owl. 93
89. EPIC II, 255 F.3d at 1080-81. A section captioned "Overall Resource Man-
agement" in the HCP concerned mitigation measures. Id. at 1080. The HCP re-
ferred to Timber Harvesting Plans which were also designed to:
[r]etain 50 to 70 percent canopy and 50 percent ground cover along
Class I and large Class II streams; . . . Protect ponds, swamps, bogs, and
seeps as separate riparian areas and identify them... as habitat retention
areas; ... Protect resource values during site preparation through [vari-
ous] measures; ... [and] design, construct, and maintain roads to mini-
mize impacts and the number of stream crossings through riparian areas.
Id. at 1077.
90. Id. at 1081 (referring to language EPIC cited as "one of numerous mitiga-
tion measures set forth in the HCP.").
91. Id. EPIC also claimed that a statement in FWS's Biological Letter under-
cut FWS's position in the litigation and its interpretation of the permit documents.
See id. According to the statement: "[r]einitiation of formal consultation is re-
quired if . . .a new species is listed or critical habitat designated that may be
affected by this action." Id. (quoting Biological Opinion Letter at 7). The EPIC H
court interpreted this language as restating the requirements of 50 C.F.R. § 402.16
and ultimately concluded that FWS's duty to reinitiate consultation still was not
triggered under the circumstances because the agency did not retain sufficient
discretionary involvement or control. Id.
92. See EPIC II, 255 F.3d at 1081. EPIC referred to provisions that "identify
thresholds for the owl population that trigger plan modifications and corrective
measures, and establish a contingency plan when thresholds are exceeded or un-
foreseen events occur." Id. However, the Ninth Circuit still maintained that these
provisions did not expand FWS's scope of authority to any other species besides
the northern spotted owl. See id.
93. See id. Other provisions that the EPIC II court rejected as evidencing an
expansion of FWS's scope of authority included the agency's ability to suspend the
permit for significant violations or breaches and its power to incorporate revisions
to the HCP to ensure that the HCP's conservation goals are met. See id.
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Next, the Ninth Circuit analyzed EPIC's argument that, under
Houston, a permitting agency has a duty to reconsult, under Section
7(a) (2), if the permitting agency maintains "some" discretionary
control. 94 The Ninth Circuit rejected EPIC's reading of Houston be-
cause Houston did not suggest that BR had continuing discretion to
amend water contracts at any time in order to address the needs of
endangered or threatened species. 95
As its final point, the EPIC II court decided that FWS did not
have the right to amend Simpson's permit for just cause under 50
C.F.R. § 13.23(b) if FWS had not retained sufficient discretion
under the permit to impose such an amendment.96 The Ninth Cir-
cuit stated that the relevant regulation did not give FWS a power
that it had not retained for itself.97 The Ninth Circuit explained
that if it had come to a contrary conclusion, an agency would not
need to retain any discretion or involvement in any permit it issued
because the agency would always have a right to amend. 98 In EPIC
II, the Ninth Circuit nevertheless concluded that Simpson was not
allowed to take the marbled murrelet or coho salmon without an
incidental take permit for those species also. 99
94. See id. at 1082 (noting importance of continuing discretion). The Ninth
Circuit, in Houston, held that BR was required to consult with NMFS because nego-
tiating and executing water contracts constitute "agency action." See Nat. Res. Def.
Council v. Houston, 146 F.3d 1118, 1125-26 (9th Cir. 1998).
95. See EPIC II, 255 F.3d at 1082. The Ninth Circuit distinguished the water
contracts involved in Houston with relative ease because the water contracts were
statutorily mandated to be on "mutually agreeable" terms between BR and NMFS.
See id. In concluding its discussion, the Ninth Circuit labeled Houston as "inappo-
site." Id.
96. See id. The right to amend for just cause is reserved by FWS and may be
exercised at any time during a permit's term, upon written finding of necessity. See
Amendment of Permits, 50 C.F.R. § 13.23(b) (2000).
97. See EPIC II, 255 F.3d at 1082 (refusing to grant FWS power under federal
regulation that FWS did not retain previously).
98. See id. The Ninth Circuit explained that the requirement of 50 C.F.R.
§ 402.16 that the duty to reinitiate consultation is contingent upon retention of
discretionary control or involvement would be rendered irrelevant if the Ninth
Circuit adopted EPIC's sought-after interpretation. See id.
99. See id. at 1083. The majority noted that Simpson submitted draft HCPs to
NMFS and FWS in 1996 and 1997 for the marbled murrelet and coho salmon. See
id. at 1076 n.2. At the time of the decision, Simpson's applications for these inci-
dental take permits were still pending. See id. Section 9 of ESA is a tool with which
FWS or EPIC may seek relief against Simpson if Simpson's activities threaten either
the marbled murrelet or coho salmon with imminent harm. See id. at 1083. The
EPIC II court offered the alternative option for FWS to revoke the permit on the
grounds that Simpson's activities would violate ESA if the two subsequently listed
species were put in imminent danger. See id. (citing Sierra Club v. Babbitt, 65 F.3d
1502, 1512 (9th Cir. 1995)).
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C. The Dissenting Opinion
In his dissent, Judge Nelson disagreed with the majority deci-
sion, stating it "contradict [ed] the plain language of [50 C.F.R.
Section 402.16], misapplie[d the] holding in Sierra Club, and frus-
trate[d] the purpose of the consultation requirement."100 The dis-
sent's primary contention with the majority's analysis centered on
whether FWS had substantial discretionary control over Simpson's
permit. 10 1 The dissent argued that FWS retained sufficient involve-
ment and control to mandate its duty to reinitiate internal consulta-
tion.10 2 The majority avoided this fact, according to the dissent, by
"creating a new requirement that the agency explicitly reserve the
right to implement measures to protect new species in the per-
mit."'1 0 3 The dissent agreed with EPIC's reading of the plain lan-
guage of 50 C.F.R. § 402.16 as requiring only that FWS have some
discretionary control over Simpson's permit and that a new species
listed after the permit's issuance may be affected by the permit.10 4
According to the dissent, "[S] ection 7 of [ ] ESA and 50 C.F.R. Sec-
tion 402.16 require FWS to determine whether . . . [the marbled
murrelet or coho salmon are] likely to be harmed before [FWS]
continues to authorize Simpson's activities."' 0 5
The dissent focused on IA's language granting FWS authority
to suspend the permit in certain situations. 10 6 The dissent further
100. EPIC II, 255 F.3d at 1083 (Nelson, J., dissenting). Judge Nelson consid-
ered aiding and protecting endangered species as per the purpose of the consulta-
tion requirement. See id. The plain language of 50 C.F.R. § 402.16 only requires
some discretionary control over a permit because requiring more control than is
explicitly necessary would contradict the statute. See id.
101. See id. (Nelson, J., dissenting) (criticizing majority's concept of discre-
tionary control issue).
102. See EPIC II, 255 F.3d at 1083 (Nelson, J., dissenting) (discussing how,
until this point, FWS's duty to reconsult was triggered if consultation could benefit
subsequently listed species).
103. Id. (Nelson, J., dissenting). The majority contested the dissent's accusa-
tion by asserting that, rather than requiring an incidental take permit to explicitly
grant FWS the power to protect the marbled murrelet and coho salmon, the ma-
jority only required the permit to reserve some discretion for FWS to act to protect
any other threatened or endangered species. See id. at 1081 n.6.
104. See id. at 1083 (Nelson, J., dissenting). Judge Nelson remarked that 50
C.F.R. § 402.16 did not mention any additional requirements nor specify that an
agency's discretionary control be of a certain nature to trigger the consultation
requirement. See id.
105. Id. at 1083-84 (Nelson, J., dissenting) (noting majority's acknowledg-
ment that FWS had some discretion over permit and that two listed species may be
affected).
106. See id. at 1084 (Nelson, J., dissenting) (arguing that, under Sierra Club
test, FWS has duty to reinitiate consultation because "it could take steps which
'inure to the benefit' of the coho salmon and marbled murrelet.").
2002]
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argued that FWS's authority was not limited to protecting only the
northern spotted owl. 10 7 Instead, the language of the HCP should
be given its intended broad meaning.108 The dissent opined that
even if the majority's narrow reading of the HCP's language was
given effect, the marbled murrelet would be covered because it was
considered sensitive before FWS issued Simpson's permit.10 9
The dissent contested the majority's assertion that FWS had no
right to amend the permit due to the language incorporated into
the permit, overriding any contrary agreement.110 The dissent re-
jected the majority's conclusion that here, as in Sierra Club, consul-
tation would be a meaningless exercise."' In contrast to the
majority, the dissent gave considerable weight to the fact that BLM
had far more limited discretion in Sierra Club and there was no con-
nection to newly listed species as distinguishing grounds between
the two cases." 2 Additionally, unlike the incidental take permit,
the right-of-way agreement did not have an equivalent clause al-
lowing amendment. 13
Judge Nelson argued that FWS could benefit the marbled
murrelet and the coho salmon by reinitiating internal consulta-
tion." 4 FWS's failure to do so, therefore, violated Section 7 of ESA
and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA)." 5 The dissent sug-
107. See EPIC II, 255 F.3d at 1084 (Nelson, J., dissenting) (citing HCP's lan-
guage as evidence that FWS's authority was not limited to northern spotted owl).
108. See id. (Nelson, J., dissenting). The dissenting judge argued to place the
marbled murrelet and the coho salmon under the ambit of "other species of con-
cern." Id.
109. See id. (Nelson,J., dissenting). The language of the HCP required Simp-
son to "ensure compatibility with the habitat of other species ... that are consid-
ered sensitive by state and federal regulatory agencies." Id. "The marbled murrelet
was considered 'sensitive' by federal and state regulatory agencies as early as June
1991" before FWS issued Simpson's permit. Id.
110. See id. (Nelson,J., dissenting). The dissent referred to language that was
incorporated into the permit which stated FWS "reserves the right to amend any
permit for just cause at any time during its term, upon written finding of neces-
sity." Id.
111. See id. at 1085 (Nelson, J., dissenting) (stating consultation would not be
futile because FWS could take measures that would benefit marbled murrelet and
coho salmon).
112. See EPIC II, 255 F.3d at 1085 (Nelson,J., dissenting) (comparing limited
circumstances available to BLM to halt construction to wider discretion available to
FWS to suspend permit).
113. See id. (Nelson, J., dissenting) (emphasizing limited authority of BLM
compared to broader authority of FWS).
114. See id. (Nelson,J., dissenting) (stating FWS could suspend harvesting un-
til Simpson developed method that would mitigate damage).
115. See id. (Nelson,J., dissenting). The dissent argued that FWS violated Sec-
tion 7 by failing to ensure that FWS, as a federal agency, did not authorize action
that was likely to jeopardize the continued existence of two listed species. Id. The
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EPIC H
gested that the majority seemed concerned about whether Simpson
had sufficient notice that FWS might exercise its discretion for the
benefit of the newly listed species.' 16 The dissent contended that
Simpson's expectations were irrelevant because FWS had an affirm-
ative duty under Section 7 to ensure that listed species would not be
harmed before it acted or authorized any activity.11 7 Further, the
plain language of the regulation and Simpson's own commitments
in the permit application were sufficient to supply Simpson with
adequate notice. 118 The dissent asserted that the majority did not
appreciate the unique duty that Section 7 imposed because the ma-
jority discussed alternative remedies available to EPIC. 11 9 The dis-
sent concluded that by not requiring Simpson to conform with
conditions the company had accepted to make its application more
attractive, the Ninth Circuit allowed the permit to be rewritten and
granted Simpson extra assurances for which it had not bargained in
the original agreement. 120
V. CRITIAL ANALYsIS
A. Going Beyond the Plain Language
The EPIC H majority consistently justified its holding on FWS's
insufficient discretion regarding Simpson's logging activities. 121
The plain language of the regulation, however, does not require or
specify that the discretion be "sufficient."122 A statute's plain lan-
basis for the dissent's APA argument was that FWS had "acted without observance
of the procedure required by law" by failing to reinitiate formal consultation. Id.
The dissent's APA analysis focused on 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). See id.
116. See EPIC II, 255 F.3d at 1085 (Nelson, J., dissenting) (stating such con-
cern obscures consultation requirement's purpose of protecting endangered and
threatened species that may be affected by federal action).
117. See id. at 1085-86 (Nelson, J., dissenting) (describing prohibited actions
under Sections 7 and 9 of ESA).
118. See id. at 1086 (Nelson, J., dissenting) (negating majority's concern that
Simpson did not have adequate notice).
119. See id. (Nelson, J., dissenting). The dissent did not believe that EPIC
would find a remedy after the species were injured and that EPIC should not have
to wait for an injury to occur before it could bring suit or seek an injunction if
Section 7's duty to consult had been properly followed. See id.
120. See id. (Nelson, J., dissenting). The dissent criticized the outcome of al-
lowing Simpson's activities subject to certain conditions but ultimately not enforc-
ing these conditions. See id.
121. See EPIC II, 255 F.3d at 1079-82 (applying Sierra Club test to hold FWS did
not retain enough discretion to trigger duty to reinitiate internal consultation).
122. For a discussion of the language of 50 C.F.R. § 402.16 (2000), see supra
note 20.
2002].-
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guage is the first tool used in its interpretation.1 23 By not strictly
following this basic statutory interpretation approach, the majority
exposed itself to criticism. 124
The dissent correctly pointed out that the plain language of
the regulation does not require discretion to be of a certain na-
ture.125 The majority's interpretation, however, presents a more ra-
tional and prudent approach than the dissenting opinion because
the purpose of the permit is given effect under the majority view. 126
After spending the initial time and money necessary for the per-
mit's issuance, FWS can protect itself from having to do so again
through narrow and vague provisions. 127 The Ninth Circuit thus
correctly held that certain requirements must be met before FWS
will be required to interfere with commercial activities that do not
conflict with the purpose of the permit.128
B. Interpretation of Case Law
Ultimately, the majority correctly found that Sierra Club gov-
erned the case because the incidental take permit was issued to a
private party and did not constitute ongoing agency action.129 The
EPIC II court's analysis of the Sierra Club's test, however, is problem-
123. See Steiger, supra note 33, at 266 (commenting "[a]ny analysis of the
meaning of a statute must begin, of course, with its words.").
124. See EPIC II, 255 F.3d at 1083 (Nelson, J., dissenting). In his dissent,
Judge Nelson commented upon the majority's contradiction of the plain language
of 50 C.F.R. § 402.16. See id. For a discussion of the dissenting opinion, see supra
notes 100-20 and accompanying text.
125. See id. (Nelson, J., dissenting) (arguing majority acknowledged FWS re-
tained some discretion over permit, thereby satisfying regulation's plain language
requirement); but see Steiger, supra note 33, at 279. Steiger's analysis of Section 7
can be applied to Section 10 because neither regulation nor its preamble explain
the meaning of "discretionary Federal involvement or control." See id.; see also
Deborah Freeman, Reinitiation of ESA § 7 Consultations Over Existing Projects, 8 NAT.
RESOURCES & ENV'T 17, 18 (Summer 1993) (commenting "it is commonplace 'that
a literal interpretation of the words of a statute is not a always a safe guide to its
meaning.'") (internal citations omitted).
126. For a detailed discussion of the differing opinions, see supra notes 82-120
and accompanying text.
127. See Fisher, supra note 11, at 400. Fisher discusses the four-fold increase
in HCP applications due to increases in land development and listings under ESA.
See id. at 399. Fisher argues FWS's funding and staffing is not matched to the
increase in HCP applications, impeding FWS from quickly processing the applica-
tions. See id. at 400.
128. See Freeman, supra note 125, at 19 (arguing reinitiation should not be
required for previously permitted projects under Section 7 without retained juris-
diction provision in approvals or underlying statute).
129. See EPIC II, 255 F.3d at 1079 (concluding that Sierra Club provides appro-
priate test). For a discussion of the facts and holding of Sierra Club, see supra notes
60-64 and accompanying text.
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atic. BLM, unlike FWS, is not a federal agency that specifically deals
with protecting endangered and threatened species.130 Therefore,
FWS should be held to a higher standard when implementing mea-
sures to benefit protected species in a private agreement.' 3 ' By not
discussing the important difference between FWS's purpose and
BLM's purpose, the majority seems to ignore FWS's critical role in
protecting endangered and threatened species. 13 2
The EPIC II majority failed to fully explain why Houston was
inapposite. 13 3 The Ninth Circuit should have analyzed its prior
holding in Houston more thoroughly because the case dealt with
agency action and an agency's affirmative duty to reinitiate consul-
tation in some situations. 34 If the EPIC Hcourt had analyzed Hous-
ton more thoroughly, its opinions would have been more consistent.
The majority spent a great deal of time discussing Sierra Club and
PRC; its cursory mention of Houston arguably may have given the
impression that Houston was more difficult to distinguish than
PRC.13 5
C. Should FWS Have Done More?
While the case law in EPIC II was properly interpreted, a legiti-
mate question arises whether FWS should have suggested that
Simpson include the coho salmon and the marbled murrelet in the
130. See Steiger, supra note 33, at 256-57. Steiger discusses FWS and NMFS's
expertise in assessing human impacts on wildlife, which agencies like BLM may
lack. See id. Steiger states "[t]he assessment of biological data is entrusted to FWS
and NMFS, which Congress created primarily to protect and conserve wildlife and
which consequently have developed expertise in assessing human impacts on wild-
life." Id.
131. See id. at 257. "Congress sought to eliminate the temptation for biologi-
cal decision-making to be treated superficially or to be influenced by nonbiological
factors" when it required agencies to consult with FWS. Id.
132. For a further discussion of the purposes and responsibilities of FWS re-
garding endangered species, see supra note 33 and accompanying text.
133. See EPIC II, 255 F.3d at 1082. In a single paragraph, Judge Thompson
recounted the facts and the Ninth Circuit's holding of Houston and stated EPIC's
basis for relying on the case. See id. Judge Thompson simply concluded, "[w]e do
not read Houston as supporting EPIC's argument.. . Houston is inapposite." Id.
134. For a discussion of Houston's facts and holding, see supra notes 70-74 and
accompanying text.
135. See EPIC II, 255 F.3d at 1080-83. The EPIC II court may have wanted to
downplay the difference in time duration of the agency actions; LRMPs last for
fifteen years. See id. at 1080. The water renewal contracts in Houston lasted for
forty years. See Nat. Res. Def. Council v. Houston, 146 F.3d 1118, 1123 (9th Cir.
1998). The duration of Simpson's incidental take permit, therefore, is more analo-
gous to the facts of Houston than PRC. See EPIC I, 255 F.3d at 1077 (stating Simp-
son's permit lasted for thirty years).
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original permit. 136 A chapter in the Handbook, published jointly by
FWS and NMFS, discusses "[o]ne of the most common questions
asked by [Section 10] permit applicants... 'What happens if a new
species is listed after [a] [S]ection 10 permit has been issued?" 3 7
Congress grappled with the issue as well, but its conclusions seem to
apply only to species which were addressed in the approved HCP.13 8
The marbled murrelet and the coho salmon were not addressed in
the HCP, making Congress' findings inapplicable to them. 39 The
EPIC Ilcourt should have considered whether Simpson should have
included the marbled murrelet and the coho salmon in the inci-
dental take permit or whether any alternatives were possible.' 40
The Ninth Circuit could have discussed this aspect of the case in
dictum for guidance in future disputes. In this respect, the majority
opinion is too narrow, especially given the circumstances of the sub-
stantial amount of land affected by the permit, the amount of wild-
life conceivably at risk of being affected, and the guidelines FWS
sets for itself.""
136. See Handbook, at 4-1, at http://fws.gov.hcp/hcpbook.htm (last updated
July 25, 2001) (establishing guidelines for FWS when setting up HCPs). For a time
frame of the listing of these species, see supra note 19 and accompanying text. In
the Handbook, FWS and NMFS state:
[t]he inclusion of proposed, candidate, or unlisted species in an HCP is
voluntary and is the decision of the applicant. The Services should explain to
any HCP applicant the benefits of addressing unlisted species in the HCP
and the risks of not doing so, and should strongly encourage the applicant
to include as many proposed and candidate species as can be adequately
addressed and covered by the permit.
Handbook, at 4-1, at http://fws.gov.hcp/hcpbook.htm. (last updated July 25, 2001)
(emphasis added).
137. See id. (referring to treatment of unlisted species as "crucial issue" for
HCP and Section 10 of ESA incidental take permits).
138. See id. When debating the 1982 amendments to ESA, Congress stated:
the Committee intends that conservation plans may address both listed
and unlisted species .... In the event that an unlisted species addressed in
the approved conservation plan subsequently is listed pursuant to the Act,
no further mitigation requirements should be imposed !f the conserva-
tion plan addressed the conservation of the species and its habitat as if the
species were listed pursuant to the Act.
Id. (emphasis added).
139. But see EPIC II, 255 F.3d at 1084 (Nelson, J., dissenting). The dissent
argued the marbled murrelet was considered "sensitive" prior to the issuance of
the permit. See id. The dissent's argument would therefore seemingly fail Con-
gress' test. For a discussion of Congress' test, see supra note 138.
140. See Handbook, at 4-4, at http://fws.gov.hcp/hcpbook.htm (last updated
July 25, 2001) (offering alternatives that applicants, like Simpson, could have con-
sidered regarding marbled murrelet and coho salmon, such as addressing species
to extent information is available while agreeing to reduced coverage under per-
mit in absence of further study or data).
141. See Handbook, at 4-3, at http://fws.gov.hcp/hcpbook.htm (last updated
July 25, 2001) (stating applicant may decide whether or not to address unlisted
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EPIC H
VI. IMPACT
ESA's goal will not be realized if courts follow the Ninth Cir-
cuit's lead of affording commercial activities more protection than
endangered and threatened species. 142 EPIC II will lead courts to
afford federal agencies, like FWS, better protection in litigation
against organizations like EPIC.1 43 The Ninth Circuit did not pe-
nalize FWS for not suggesting that other species be included in
Simpson's permit; therefore, FWS will likely not take any further
steps to protect other species that are not included in an incidental
take permit or in an HCP. 144 Other circuit courts will face this
question as more permits are issued and even more species are
listed as endangered and threatened.145 If other circuits follow the
Ninth Circuit's holding, FWS will retain discretionary powers very
limited and specific to one species while courts will require nothing
more. 146
Some courts will criticize FWS for giving too much considera-
tion to economic and commercial activities when it issues incidental
take permits.1 47 However, it is Congress' responsibility, not the ju-
dicial responsibility of the courts, to return FWS's focus to protect-
species based on likelihood of listing in foreseeable future); but see Fisher, supra
note 11, at 382 (arguing substantial time-consuming biological investigations may
be necessary to address unlisted species because considerably less is known about
unlisted species).
142. See Fisher, supra note 11, at 373. "Congress intended that the
[a]mendment's actual effect would, in the aggregate, provide more effective pro-
tection of endangered species." Id.; see also TVA, 437 U.S. 153, 184 (1978). The
Supreme Court commented that Congressional intent when enacting ESA "was to
halt and reverse the trend toward species extinction, whatever the cost. This is
reflected not only in the stated policies of the [ESA], but in literally every section
of the statute." Id.
143. See Sierra Club, 65 F.3d 1502, 1509 (9th Cir. 1995). If the Ninth Circuit
applies the Sierra Club test in future litigation, FWS will not have to reinitiate con-
sultation unless it will inure to the benefit of a protected species. For a discussion
of this test, see supra note 63 and accompanying text.
144. For a discussion of treatment of unlisted species by Congress and FWS,
see supra note 138 and accompanying text (maintaining permit applicant may vol-
untarily include proposed and candidate species but this is not mandated).
145. See Fisher, supra note 11, at 373-74. Fisher argues the number of HCPs
developed and implemented between 1982 and 1991 was "wholly inadequate to
alleviate the ever-burgeoning tensions created by the growing number of listed
species." Id. at 373. By 1991, over 650 species had been added to the endangered
species list but FWS only approved eleven HCPs. See id. Presumably, more parties
will apply for permits, as Simpson did, following a species' listing to avoid violating
Section 9. See EPIC HI, 255 F.3d at 1076 (stating Simpson's logging activities ex-
posed company to potential liability under Section 9 following owls' listing).
146. For a discussion of how this interpretation worked to FWS's advantage in
EPIC II, see supa notes 88-93 and accompanying text.
147. For a discussion of the functions that FWS and NMFS serve, see supra
note 33 and accompanying text.
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ing endangered and threatened species with legislation. 148 Further,
if there is little likelihood that other species will be listed in the
near future, private actors will avoid including multiple species in
their applications for incidental take permits. 149
Furthermore, if a claim is brought against FWS on similar facts,
courts within the Ninth Circuit's jurisdiction will require FWS to
take only those actions to protect other species that it took in EPIC
11.150 While the EPIC Hlholding has far reaching and possibly nega-
tive repercussions for the protection of endangered and threatened
species, it is Congress that has allowed this effect by not using clear,
plain language in the statute and regulations. 1 1 Other courts, how-
ever, will agree with the dissent and decide that FWS is not fulfilling
its obligation to protect all species requiring its aid, regardless of
the nature of discretion retained. 152 In sum, the holding of EPIC II
will allow FWS to continue protecting itself but not species left from
permit applications.
Dina Cortese
148. See id.
149. See Handbook, at 4-1 - 4-4, at http://fws.gov.hcp/hcpbook.htm (last up-
dated July 25, 2001) (discussing voluntariness of including species and factors that
contribute to species being excluded from permit).
150. For a discussion of the Ninth Circuit's analysis of permit provisions insuf-
ficient to trigger the duty to reinitiate consultation, see supra notes 25, 27, 93 and
accompanying text.
151. See Steiger, supra note 33, at 279 (observing regulations and preambles
governing Sections 7 and 10 of ESA do not give an explanation of "discretionary
Federal involvement or control.").
152. See EPIC I 255 F.3d at 1083 (Nelson, J., dissenting) (arguing plain lan-
guage of regulation mandates reinitiation of consultation).
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